Therefore 24,000 must be a
liberal estimate of his infantry strength after the battle of
Franklin. The infantry strength of the Fourth and Twenty-third
corps did not exceed 22,000 present for duty equipped, of which
one brigade (Cooper's) of the Twenty-third was sent by General
Thomas to guard the fords of Duck River below Columbia, and did
not rejoin the corps until after the battle of Franklin. Hence
Hood's infantry force at Columbia and Franklin was nearly one half
greater then mine. The disparity in cavalry was still greater at
first, but was reduced very considerably by the arrival of cavalry
sent from Nashville by General Thomas, especially Hammond's brigade,
which arrived in the field on the 29th, too late to assist in
holding the line of Duck River.

HOOD'S MOTIVE AT NASHVILLE

It follows that Hood had an opportunity to conduct operations
against an adversary of, at the most, only two thirds his own
strength in infantry and in cavalry--an opportunity such as had
never before been presented to any Confederate general. That he
thought his chance a very brilliant one is not remarkable. If he
could cut off my retreat or force me to a pitched battle, he had
full reason to hope for the most decisive results. This fact should
be given full weight in connection with the question why Hood did
not avoid intrenched positions and make a raid into Kentucky, which
he could easily have done at that time, because Thomas was not yet
ready to meet him in the open field. The moral effect of such a
raid would, of course, have been very great; but it must have proved
disastrous in the end, for the reason that Thomas would in a short
time have had in Hood's rear a far superior force to cut off his
retreat and force him to a decisive battle; whereas if Hood could
defeat and seriously cripple, if not destroy, the only organized
army in the field then opposed to him, he could afterward attend
to Thomas's scattered detachments in succession, or invade Kentucky,
as he might think expedient. As Hood was operating in the country
of his own friends, he did not lack full and accurate information
of the strength and movements of his adversary. Indeed, we were
also fully informed in due time of all of Hood's movements, but
overestimated his strength because we did not have friends residing
in his camps.

But the defeat of Hood at Franklin, and Thomas's concentration of
troops at N