thirty-six hours. Time is an element in military problems the
value of which cannot be too highly estimated, yet how seldom has
it been duly appreciated!

The remnant of Hood's army having made its escape across the
Tennessee River, the pursuit terminated, and General Thomas issued
his remarkable General Orders No. 169, announcing that "the rear-
guard of the flying and dispirited enemy was driven across the
Tennessee River. . . ."( 3)

Orders were then issued by General Thomas distributing his army
along the Tennessee River in winter quarters, and he commenced
planning a campaign for the ensuing spring, the general features
of which he telegraphed me, asking my opinion. His proposition
seemed to show so different an appreciation from my own of the
actual state of the war and of the demands of the country upon its
army at that momentous crisis, and views so different from mine in
respect to the strategic principles that should govern future
operations, that I wrote to General Grant and General Sherman,
giving them briefly my views upon the subject, and requesting an
order to join them on the Atlantic coast, to aid in terminating
the rebellion. My letter to General Grant was promptly followed
by a telegram to General Thomas directing him to send me east with
the Twenty-third Corps, which enabled me to participate in the
closing campaign of the war.

LETTER TO GRANT

The following are the letters, above referred to, to Grant and
Sherman, whose appreciation of the views therein expressed is
sufficiently shown by the published history of subsequent operations,
and the orders sent to Thomas by General Grant and the War Department
during that time:

"(Unofficial.)
"Columbia, Tenn., December 27, 1864.
"Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, Commanding U. S. Armies, City
Point, Va.

"General: My corps was sent back to Tennessee by General Sherman,
instead of remaining with him on him march through Georgia, according
to his original design, for two reasons, viz.: First, because
General Thomas was not regarded strong enough after it became
evident that Hood designed to invade Tennessee; and, second, in
order that I might fill up my corps from the new troops then arriving
in Tennessee. These reasons now no longer exist. By uniting my
troops with Stanley's, we were able to hold Hood in check at Columbia
and Franklin until General Thomas could concentrate at