the left center of our line, where only a feint
was to be made. The Fourth Corps was to carry a salient advanced
line, while the main attack was to be made on the enemy's extreme
left by A. J. Smith's corps and the cavalry. After the order was
prepared I went to General Thomas with a map of the position showing
the exact length of the several parts of the enemy's line, and
explained to him that the force he had assigned to our left wing
was at least 10,000 men more than could be used to any advantage
unless for a real attack; and that, on the other hand, Smith's
force was not large enough for the real attack, considering the
extent of the ground occupied by the enemy on that flank. Hence
I suggested that my corps should support Smith instead of remaining
on the left of Wood. To this suggestion General Thomas readily
acceded, and orally authorized me to carry it into effect, but made
no change in his written order. The result of this change of plan
was that the close of the first day's engagement found the Twenty-
third Corps on the extreme right of our infantry line, in the most
advanced position captured from the enemy. Yet General Thomas, in
his official report, made no mention of this change of plan, but
said "the original plan of battle, with but few alterations, [was]
strictly adhered to."( 1) The "alterations" were certainly "few".
A change from 10,000 to 20,000 infantry in the main attacking force
may not properly be described as _many_ "alterations," but it looks
like one very _large_ one--sufficient, one would suppose, to
determine the difference between failure and success.

The plan of battle issued December 14 had been matured and made
known to the principal subordinate commanders several days before,
when General Thomas intended to attack, but was prevented by the
storm. Hence there had been ample time for critical consideration
and discussion of the details of that plan, the result of which
was the modification made at the conference in the afternoon or
evening of December 14, which modification was not embodied in the
written order, but was orally directed to be carried out. If
General Thomas had caused that clerical work to be done in the
evening of December 14, his published orders and his battle of
December 15 would have been in complete harmony. There would not,
so far as I know, have been even a "few alterations." In this
connection, the difference between the "Special Field Order No.
34