e part of his cavalry, with
some infantry, away to Murfreesboro'. This disparity must have
been perfectly well known to Hood, though not to Thomas. Hence it
would seem that Hood must have known that it was utterly impossible
for his army to resist the assaults which he must expect on December
16. Since all this has become known, it is impossible not to see
now that the comparatively feeble resistance offered by the
Confederate troops at Nashville was due not so much, perhaps, to
any lack of valor on the part of those troops, as to their
comparatively small numbers. I recall distinctly the conversation
I had with a Confederate field-officer a few minutes after he was
captured that day, and which I reported to General Thomas that
evening. In answer to my question as to when the Confederate troops
recognized the fact that they were beaten, he answered, "Not till
you routed us just now." I did not believe him then, for I thought
they must have recognized their defeat at Franklin, or at least on
the 15th, at Nashville. But now I think he probably told me the
exact truth. I doubt if any soldiers in the world ever needed so
much cumulative evidence to convince them that they were beaten.
"Brave boys were they!" If they had been fighting in a cause that
commanded the sympathy and support of the public conscience of the
world, they could never have been beaten; it is not necessary to
search for any other cause of the failure of the Confederate States.

DELAY IN RENEWING THE ATTACK ON THE 16TH

The most notable failure, on our side, of the battle of December
16 was the wasting of nearly the entire day, so that operations
ended with the successful assault at dark. What was left of Hood's
army had time to retreat across the Harpeth during the night and
destroy the bridges before the pursuit could be commenced.

But the results of the two days' operations at Nashville were too
gratifying to admit of contemporaneous criticism. The battle has
been generally accepted as a perfect exemplification of the art of
war. It is certainly a good subject for the study of military
students, and it is partly for their benefit that I have pointed
out some of its prominent defects as I understood them. Its
commendable features are sufficiently evident; but in studying the
actions that have resulted in victory, we are apt to overlook the
errors without which the victory might have been far more compl