ssments experienced during the
retreat was replaced by reflections of a much more satisfactory
character. From that time forward my relations with General Thomas
were of the same cordial character as they always had been; and I
was much gratified by the flattering indorsement he placed on my
official report, of which I then knew the substance, if not the
exact words.

The Fourth Army Corps and the cavalry corps of the Military Division
of the Mississippi having been under my command during only the
few days occupied in the operations between Pulaski and Nashville
(November 14 to December 1), no reports of the operations of those
two corps were ever made to me after the close of that brief period.
Hence it was not possible for me to give any full account of the
distinguished services of those two corps. The cavalry were never
seen by me. They were far in front or on the flank, doing all the
"seeing" for me, giving me information of vital importance in
respect to the enemy's movements. How important that information
was then regarded may be learned by a perusal of the despatches to
and from General Thomas during those days of anxious uncertainty
as to the enemy's plans. I believe no cavalry ever performed that
important service more efficiently. At no time in that short
campaign did I suffer any inconvenience from lack of information
that cavalry could possibly give. If it is true that the operations
of our cavalry were to some extent influenced by apprehension of
a cavalry raid on Nashville or other vital point in our rear, that
was only what General Thomas had been apprehending all the time,
and to meet with which he had assembled eight thousand troops in
Nashville, perhaps not informing the commander of his own cavalry
of that fact quite as early as he might have done.( 1)

In fact, the redoubtable Forrest had become famous, and his troopers
were esteemed a very large factor in the problem then undergoing
solution--greater in some respects, as I have pointed out, than
the events justified. In my report of the battle of Franklin I
gave all the information in my possession of the gallant action of
our cavalry in driving that of the enemy back across the Harpeth
at the very time when his infantry assault was decisively repulsed.

I have always regarded it as a very remarkable, and to me a very
fortunate, circumstance that the movements of my infantry columns
were at no time seriously interfered with by the ene