hy he had telegraphed to me
rather than to the quartermaster whose duty it was to furnish
supplies for his army--and a most capable and efficient quartermaster
he was. I had only a short time before voluntarily sent General
Grant 5000 men, and I inferred that there was some connection
between the incidents.

The immense change in the whole military situation which was produced
in a few minutes at Franklin (for the contest there was in fact
decided in that time, by the recovery of the breach in the line),
and that by a battle which had not been contemplated by either
General Thomas or myself (that is, on the south side of the Harpeth
River, with that stream in the rear of the army), nor yet by General
Hood until he saw the apparent opportunity to destroy his adversary;
and the fact that that dangerous situation had been produced and
the battle rendered necessary by slight accidents or mistakes which
might easily have been foreseen or avoided, cannot, it seems to
me, but produce in every thoughtful mind some reflection upon the
influence exercised by what is called "accident" or "chance" in
war. The "fortune of war" was, upon the whole, always in my favor,
in spite of adverse accidents; yet I have always acted upon the
principle that the highest duty of a commander is to anticipate
and provide for every possible contingency of war, so as to eliminate
what is called chance.

THE AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF THE SOUTH

Both Johnston and Hood refer in their narratives to the earnest
desire of their commander-in-chief, President Davis, that the army
they in succession commanded should undertake an aggressive campaign.
Johnston demonstrated that, under the circumstances existing while
he was in command, such an undertaking could not possibly have been
successful. Hood tried it under far more favorable circumstances,
and yet he failed, as had every former attempt of the Confederate
armies. The result in every case was costly failure, and in the
last overwhelming defeat. How much greater would have been the
military strength of the South if those losses had been avoided,
and how much greater would have been her moral strength if she had
maintained from the start a firm, consistent, and humane defensive
policy! How long would the conservative people of the North have
sustained the "invasion" of States where the people were fighting
only to "defend their homes and families." Did not the