all
try and get Wilson on my flank this morning. Forrest was all around
us yesterday, but we brushed him away in the evening and came
through. Hood attacked in the front and flank, but did not hurt
us."

This last despatch was written before daylight, on my arrival at
Franklin, before I learned that there were no bridges across the
river. If pontoons had been laid or the wagon and railroad bridges
improved on the 29th, as was done by me after my arrival, all could
have crossed by noon of the 30th.

General Thomas's reply of 10:25 A. M. was as follows:

"Your despatches of 5:30 and 5:50, and Wilson's despatches, forwarded
by you, have been received. It will take Smith quite all day to
disembark; but if I find there is no immediate necessity to retain
him here, will send him to Franklin or Brentwood, according to
circumstances. If you can prevent Hood from turning your position
at Franklin, it should be held; but I do not wish you to risk too
much. I send you a map of the environs of Franklin."

Again I telegraphed at 9:50 A. M.:

"My trains are coming in all right, and half of the troops are here
and the other half about five miles out, coming on in good order,
with light skirmishing. I will have all across the river this
evening. Wilson is here, and has his cavalry on my flank. I do
not know where Forrest is. He may have gone east, but, no doubt,
will strike our flank and rear again soon. Wilson is entirely
unable to cope with him. Of course I cannot prevent Hood from
crossing the Harpeth whenever he may attempt it. Do you desire me
to hold on here until compelled to fall back?"

And at 11 A. M. I telegraphed: "Troops and trains in all right."

At noon I answered as follows General Thomas's last despatch:

"Your despatch of 10:25 A. M. is received. I am satisfied that I
have heretofore run too much risk in trying to hold Hood in check
while so far inferior to him in both infantry and cavalry. The
slightest mistake on my part, or failure of a subordinate, during
the last three days might have proved disastrous. I don't want to
get into so tight a place again; yet I will cheerfully act in
accordance with your views of expediency, if you think it important
to hold Hood back as long as possible. When you get all your troops
together, and the cavalry in effective condition, we can easily
whip Hood, and, I believe, make the campaign a decisive one. Before
that, the most we can do is to husband ou