r than my entire army,
between my detachments. If that had occurred before my reinforcements
arrived, I would have been caught in the worst possible condition.
Hence, in the absence of certain information in respect to when
reinforcements would arrive, and their aggregate strength, a division
of my force was inadmissible. An inferior force should generally
be kept in one compact body, while a superior force may often be
divided to great advantage.

I now direct attention to the correspondence between General Thomas
and myself, on November 30, before the battle of Franklin, showing
that he was not ready for battle at Nashville, and his desire that
I should, if possible, hold Hood back three days longer; and showing
that my estimate of the importance of time when I was at Columbia
was by no means exaggerated; also showing General Thomas's views
and mine of the military situation before the battle, and the action
then determined on and ordered and partially executed by the movement
of trains toward Nashville before the battle opened. The results
of the battle were not such, even if they had been fully known at
the time, as to have rendered admissible any change in those orders.

"Nashville, [November] 30, [1864,] 4 A. M.
"Captain A. J. Twining, Franklin:

"Your despatch of 1 A. M. to-day is received. Please inform General
Schofield that Major-General Smith's troops have just arrived at
the levee and are still on boats, and that it is impossible for
them to reach Franklin to-day. He must make strong efforts to
cover his wagon-train, protecting it against the enemy, as well as
to reach Franklin with his command and get into position there.
I will despatch him further in a few hours.

"Geo. H. Thomas"

HOPING TO DELAY HOOD FOR THREE DAYS AT FRANKLIN

The next despatch from General Thomas was at 10:25 A. M. By that
time he had received two more despatches from me, as follows, I
having arrived at Franklin between 4 and 5 A. M.:

"Franklin, November 30, 1864, 5 A. M.
"Have just seen your despatch to Captain Twining of 4 A. M. If
Smith is not needed for the immediate defense of Nashville, I think
he had better march for Franklin at once. He could at least cover
my wagon-train if I have to fall back from here."

"Franklin, November 30, 1864, 5:30 A. M.
"I hope to get my troops and material safely across the Harpeth
this morning. We have suffered no material loss so far. I sh