_, and I had ample time to get out of his way before
morning. After 8 A. M. it would, of course, not have been so easy.
Yet a retreat to Franklin that day (November 29), commencing at
eight or nine in the morning, and across the Harpeth that night,
would not have been at all difficult or dangerous. There would
have been some fighting with Hood's cavalry, but little or none
with his infantry. Hood would have had to lay a pontoon bridge at
Columbia, after my rear-guard had withdrawn, before his advance
from that point could begin; and, as events proved, he could not
reach Spring Hill by his mud road from Huey's Mill until late in
the afternoon. I had time to pass Spring Hill with my entire army
before Hood's infantry advance-guard could reach that place. Hence
I had ample time to consider the mathematical and physical questions
involved before deciding finally that I would not let Hood drive
me back from Duck River that day. But I did not at any time
contemplate a retreat that day farther back then Spring Hill, as
is shown by my direction to Ruger to have his regiment from Ducktown
join him there that night.

NO SERIOUS DANGER AT SPRING HILL

I am entirely willing to leave to intelligent military criticism
any question in respect to the accuracy of my calculations, also
the question whether I was justifiable, under the conditions then
existing or understood to exist respecting Thomas's preparations
in the rear to fight a decisive battle, in taking the risks, which
are always more or less unavoidable, of failure in the execution
of plans based upon so close an estimate of what could be done by
my adversary as well as by myself. I content myself with the simple
remark that, in my opinion, if my own orders had been carried out
as I gave them, and my reasonable suggestion to my superior in the
rear to bridge the Harpeth at Franklin had been promptly acted on,
there would have been far less risk of failure than must frequently
be incurred in war.

If I had had satisfactory assurance of the timely arrival of
sufficient reinforcements on the line of Duck River, I would have
been justified in dividing my infantry into several detachments to
support the cavalry in opposing the crossing of Duck River at the
numerous places above Columbia. But, sooner or later, Hood could
have forced a crossing at some one of those places, and thus have
interposed a compact body of troops, large