r strength and increase
it as much as possible. I fear the troops which were stationed on
the river below Columbia will be lost. I will get my trains out
of the way as soon as possible, and watch Hood carefully. Possibly
I may be able to hold him here, but do not expect to be able to do
so long."

This despatch shows not only my opinion at that time of the kind
of "place" I had been in, but my belief that the character of that
situation had been due largely to Thomas's action in leaving me
without the expected reinforcements, and in not providing the means
of crossing the Harpeth River.

HOPING TO DELAY HOOD FOR THREE DAYS AT FRANKLIN

The following seems to show that General Thomas did not even then
see the importance of prompt concentration of all his available
force in front of the enemy, but expected me, with two corps, to
fight the entire hostile force until he could complete his
concentration at Nashville. Even before the battle of Franklin he
seems to have thought he could take his time to concentrate,
reorganize his cavalry, and then "try Hood again."

"Nashville, November 30, 1864.
"Major-General Schofield, Franklin:

"General Smith reported to me this morning that one division of
his troops is still behind; we must therefore try to hold Hood
where he is now until those troops can get up, and the steamers
return. After that we will concentrate here, reorganize our cavalry,
and try Hood again. Do you think you can hold Hood at Franklin
for three days longer? Answer, giving your views; and I should
like to know what Wilson thinks he can do to aid you in holding
Hood.

"Geo. H. Thomas,
"Major-General U. S. Vols, Commanding."

Thereupon, in the following telegram, dated 3 P. M., I proposed
Brentwood as a point where A. J. Smith's and all the other troops
could surely unite with mine:

"I have just received your despatch asking whether I can hold Hood
here three days. I do not believe I can. I can doubtless hold
him one day, but will hazard something in doing that. He now has
a large force, probably two corps, in my front, and seems preparing
to cross the river above and below. I think he can effect a crossing
to-morrow in spite of all my efforts, and probably to-night, if he
attempts it. A worse position than this for an inferior force
could hardly be found. I will refer your question to General Wilson
this evening. I think he can do very little. I have