NO SERIOUS DANGER AT SPRING HILL

The situation early in the morning had been a very simple one, free
from any embarrassment or unusual danger. If the plan then decided
on and ordered had been carried out, three divisions of infantry
and nearly all the artillery of the army would have been in position
at Spring Hill and well intrenched long before the head of Hood's
infantry column, without any artillery, came in sight of that place
late in the afternoon. That position would have been secured beyond
doubt until the next morning. The other two divisions (Cox's and
Wood's) would have withdrawn from Duck River and marched to Spring
Hill early in the afternoon, before the enemy could seriously
interfere with them. Ruger's one regiment, without impedimenta,
was directed to march along the railway track to Spring Hill, and
thus avoid any interference from the enemy. The army would have
marched to Franklin early in the night of the 29th, instead of
after midnight as it actually did. That would have given the enemy
the afternoon and night in which to lay his pontoons and cross his
artillery and trains at Columbia. But that would not have been a
serious matter, in view of the situation as it was understood by
me up to about 8 A. M. of the 29th; for the information I had
received up to that hour justified the belief that both A. J.
Smith's troops and those concentrated at Murfreesboro' would meet
me at Franklin, or perhaps at Spring Hill, where we would be able
to give battle to the enemy on equal terms.

But in view of the information received by me after eight o'clock
that morning, and the altered plan decided on soon after ten o'clock,
the situation became very materially different. Under this plan
the army must be ready to encounter a formidable enemy either in
the position then occupied on Duck River, or at some point on the
road between that place and Spring Hill. Hence I determined to
keep the main body of troops together, and trust to Stanley's one
division to hold Spring Hill until the army should reach that point.
That is to say, I decided to take the chances of a pitched battle
at any point the enemy might select between Duck River and Spring
Hill, as well as that of holding the latter place with one division
against any hostile force which might reach it before dark.

There was no anxiety in my mind about what might happen at Spring
Hill after dark. The danger which actually developed there between