My theory is that he will operate
against the Chattanooga Railroad, and I do not see how we can save
it from some damage at least. But if we concentrate Granger's
troops and those along the road promptly, so that they can join
the main force, there can be no doubt of the final result. Please
inform me whether my proposed arrangements meet with your approval."

"Thomas to Schofield
"Nashville, November 24, 1864.
". . . Can you not cover the pontoon bridge with a bridge-head,
and hold it so as to preserve the bridge for crossing whenever we
get ready to advance? General Rousseau informed me that the
blockhouses protecting the railroad bridge cannot be reached by
the enemy's artillery; therefore the enemy could not get near enough
to the bridge to destroy it if the blockhouses are held. . . ."

As stated in my official report, I did prepare and hold a bridge-
head covering both the railroad and the pontoon bridges over Duck
River at the same time, for which purpose I floated the pontoons
down the river to a point near the railroad bridge, having found
that the blockhouses referred to by General Rousseau could not be
made available for the protection of the pontoon bridge where it
before was--at the crossing of the turnpike. I abandoned that
bridge-head on the night of November 27, upon receipt of information
leading me to believe that Hood intended to cross Duck River above
Columbia.

On November 25 General Thomas telegraphed me, in the following
terms, his approval of the dispositions I had made, and the
information that he had already ordered the concentration of troops
which I suggested in my despatch of the 24th:

"Your cipher despatch of 8:30 P. M. is just received; some difficulty
in transmission the cause. Your arrangements are judicious and
approved. I gave orders two days ago to make the concentration
you suggest, and hope it will be nearly or quite completed to-day.
Will telegraph you further this morning."

This despatch was more than twelve hours in transmission.

Again, November 26, I reported the situation at Columbia, and my
action, as follows; also suggesting that infantry be sent forward
at once:

"The enemy has kept up a strong demonstration with dismounted
cavalry since yesterday morning. He now shows a column of infantry
on the Mount Pleasant pike, about three miles distant. I cannot
yet tell how great the force. I have drawn my force in the interior
line, and will fight him th