situation in which I was placed, in lieu of his previous
embarrassing orders about fighting the enemy at Pulaski.

The following correspondence,(12) with the above, shows the situation
as reported by me to General Thomas, and his "plans and wishes" as
then explained to me immediately before and after Hood began his
advance:

"Thomas to Schofield.
"November 24, 1864.
". . . Have the fords above Columbia as well guarded as you can,
and I think you will then have checked the advance of Hood, and we
shall have time to get up our reinforcements."

"Schofield to Thomas.
"November 24, 1864, 1:39 P. M.
"Do you think it important to hold Columbia? My force is not large
enough to cover the town and railroad bridge. I can hold a shorter
line covering the railroad bridge, leaving the town and railroad
depot outside; but in any case the enemy can turn the position by
crossing above or below, and render my withdrawal to the north bank
very difficult. Please give me your views soon."

"Thomas to Schofield.
"November 24, 1864.
"If you cannot hold Columbia, you had better withdraw to the north
bank of the river. From the description given I supposed the line
was sufficiently short to enable you and Stanley to hold it securely
and have a reserve. But it is better, of course, to substantially
check the enemy than to run the risk of defeat by risking too much.
Where is Stanley? Is he with you?"

CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS

"Schofield to Thomas
"Columbia, November 24, 1864, 8:30 P. M.
"I have examined the ground and considered the situation carefully.
My troops are in position on the outer line, covering the railroad
depot and bridge, and pretty well intrenched. The line is too
long; yet if Hood wishes to fight me on it to-morrow, I am willing.
I think he will attack to-morrow, if at all. If he does not, I
must prepare to meet any attempt to cross Duck River above or below.
For this purpose I am preparing an interior line covering the
railroad bridge, which can be held by about seven thousand men,
which I propose to occupy, and put the rest of my troops and material
on the north bank of the river, ready to move as may be necessary.
With the fords guarded, as will then be practicable, I think Hood
cannot get the start of me. I think it best not to risk much now;
for a few days' delay, if we concentrate rapidly, will make us
strong enough to drive Hood back.