ere. If you have any infantry available,
I think it should be sent forward at once."

Yet no infantry reinforcements were sent, although the "7000 men"
at Chattanooga could easily have reached Columbia before that time.

At 8 A. M. the next day General Thomas replied as follows:

"Your despatch of 10 A. M. yesterday received. I will send you
all the available infantry force I can raise. I expect some of
Smith's command here to-day, and will send it forward as rapidly
as possible. Sent you two regiments of cavalry day before yesterday,
two yesterday, and will send another to-day. If you can hold Hood
in check until I can get Smith up, we can whip him."

Thus it appears that even as late as November 27 General Thomas
had not thought of sending the 7000 men at Chattanooga to "join
the main force," although so anxious that I should hold Hood in
check until he could get Smith up. He was still relying entirely
upon A. J. Smith, whose advance, so surely expected on the 25th,
was still expected on the 27th. It seems incredible that General
Thomas had not thought of sending Steedman's troops from Chattanooga,
instead of waiting for the uncertain arrival of A. J. Smith.

DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER

On November 27 I received an important despatch from General Thomas,
dated November 25. It was written under the apprehension that
Hood's design might be to move upon the Nashville and Chattanooga
Railroad, as I had suggested to Thomas on the 24th, and informed
me fully of his plans and instructions to meet such a movement,
requesting me to give him my views in reply. In that despatch
General Thomas said:

"In case you have to move to the north bank of Duck River, I wish
you to keep some cavalry on the south side to observe and delay
Hood's advance on the Chattanooga Railroad as much as possible.
I hope to have five regiments of Granger's troops in Murfreesboro'
to-day. Have made arrangements for Milroy to fall back to
Murfreesboro' or this side of Duck River also, if the enemy advances.
The cavalry on the south side of Duck River should cover the
approaches to Shelbyville, and cross at that place, and hold the
bridge in case of an advance in force. I have asked General Steedman
how large a force he can raise to threaten the enemy's rear, should
he get on the Chattanooga road, and expect an answer soon. About
1000 of Hatch's cavalry have arrived here from Memphis, dis