It is, and always has
been, my intention to command the troops with me in person." The
proper place for a general-in-chief is with his army in the field,
where battles are to be fought, and not in the rear, where there
is little to do but to assemble reinforcements, which his chief of
staff could do as well as he. Thomas could have reached the army
at Columbia by rail in two hours, and at Franklin in one hour; yet
he left a subordinate to fight against a superior force, while he
remained in Nashville until he had collected there an army superior
to that of his adversary. But General Thomas must have had some
reason which seemed to him good and sufficient for his absence from
the field. He was the last man in the world to shrink from his
duty in battle.

Before the above correspondence between General Sherman and General
Thomas was known to me I had written the following: "The relations
existing between General Thomas and me, and the confidence he had
shown in all his despatches, commencing with those received at
Pulaski, left little room for hesitation or doubt about doing, in
every emergency, what my own judgment dictated, as if I had been
in chief command, confident of the approval which he so fully
expressed after the events. Yet my experience then, as always,
led me to the opinion that it is better for the general-in-chief,
in all operations of a critical nature, to be present with the
troops in the field, if possible; he must be able to act with more
confidence than any subordinate can possibly feel. He was the sole
judge as to the necessity of his remaining in Nashville, and no
good reason could now be given for questioning the correctness of
his judgment. It is only intended as an expression of a general
rule for the consideration of military students."

CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS

General Thomas's orders to General D. S. Stanley upon his being
sent to Pulaski, and his subsequent orders to me, dated November
19, to fight the enemy at Pulaski if he advanced against that place,
were, as shown in the following despatch from me, quite inapplicable
to the then existing situation:

"Pulaski, November 20, 1864.
"Major-General Thomas: After full consideration I am of the opinion
that this is not the best position for the main body of our troops,
at least so long as we are inferior in strength to the enemy. If
Hood advances, whether his design be to strike