revented a raid in Thomas's rear. But
until he was strong enough to advance, unless forced to the extreme
necessity of defending Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur, and
abandoning all else, Thomas could not prudently have reduced his
garrisons or guards.

I knew nothing at that time of Sherman's instructions to Thomas,
and little about the actual strength of Thomas's garrisons and
railroad guards. But I was under the impression that some
reinforcements must be available from his own department, and felt
a little impatient about the long delay in their arrival, and hence
telegraphed General Thomas, November 24, suggesting the concentration
of R. S. Granger's troops and those along the railroad. The
despatches to me at that time, to be found in the War Records,( 4)
fully show the earnest determination of General Thomas to send
forward reinforcements as soon as possible, and even in detail,
and to fight Hood at or near Columbia. Indeed, those despatches
misled me somewhat as to what I might expect.

AVAILABLE TROOPS NOT SENT TO THE FRONT

Notwithstanding this earnest desire, General Thomas does not appear
to have realized the existence of a force available for the purpose
he had in view. The railroad guards from Atlanta to Chattanooga
or Dalton, withdrawn after Sherman started on his march, and
convalescents, men returning from furlough and others going to the
front, but failing to reach Sherman's army in time, all assembled
at Chattanooga, made a surplus force at that point of about 7000
men.( 5) Some of these troops had been sent to East Tennessee, as
well as all the mounted troops available in Kentucky, for the
purpose of retrieving the disaster which had befallen the Tennessee
military governor's troops there, under Gillem. But all sent from
Chattanooga had been returned by November 21, about the time when
Hood's advance from Florence had become certainly known. Yet it
does not appear that General Thomas even inquired what force was
available at Chattanooga until November 25, when, in reply to a
telegram, he learned that Steedman could raise 5000 men (in fact,
7000), in addition to all necessary garrisons and guards, "to
threaten enemy in rear," in case he should "get on Chattanooga
railroad." It may then (November 25) have been too late to send
those 5000 or 7000 men to the line of Duck River, or perhaps even
to Franklin. They were sent to Nashville, reaching there a