to any subjective process of the mind.
Similarity is indeed perceived by the visual sense but yet the
association of the name in accordance with the perception of
similarity and the instruction received is a separate act and is
called _upamana_ [Footnote ref 1].
S'abda-prama@na or testimony is the right knowledge which
we derive from the utterances of infallible and absolutely truthful
persons. All knowledge derived from the Vedas is valid, for the
Vedas were uttered by Is'vara himself. The Vedas give us
right knowledge not of itself, but because they came out as the
utterances of the infallible Is'vara. The Vais'e@sikas did not admit
s'abda as a separate prama@na, but they sought to establish the
validity of testimony (_s'abda_) on the strength of inference (_anumiti_)
on the ground of its being the utterance of an infallible
person. But as I have said before, this explanation is hardly
corroborated by the Vais'e@sika sutras, which tacitly admit the
validity of the scriptures on its own authority. But anyhow this
was how Vais'e@sika was interpreted in later times.
Negation in Nyaya-Vais'e@sika.
The problem of negation or non-existence (_abhava_) is of great interest
in Indian philosophy. In this section we can describe its nature only
from the point of view of perceptibility. Kumarila [Footnote ref 2]
____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _Nyayamanjari_ on upamana. The oldest Nyaya view was that
the instruction given by the forester by virtue of which the association
of the name "wild ox" to the strange animal was possible was itself
"upamana." When Pras'astapada held that upamana should be treated as a
case of testimony (_aptavacana_), he had probably this interpretation
in view. But Udyotakara and Vacaspati hold that it was not by the
instruction alone of the forester that the association of the name
"wild ox" was made, but there was the perception of similarity, and
the memory of the instruction of the forester too. So it is the
perception of similarity with the other two factors as accessories
that lead us to this association called upamana. What Vatsyaya@na
meant is not very clear, but Di@nnaga supposes that according to
him the result of upamana was the knowledge of similarity or the
knowledge of a thing having similarity. Vacaspati of course holds that
he has correctly interpreted Vatsyaya@na's intention. It is however
definite that upamana means the a
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