its own purity. It is the negative state of absolute painlessness
in mukti that is sometimes spoken of as being a state of absolute
happiness (_ananda_), though really speaking the state of mukti
can never be a state of happiness. It is a passive state of self in
its original and natural purity unassociated with pleasure, pain,
knowledge, willing, etc. [Footnote ref 1].

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[Footnote 1: _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 499-533.]

CHAPTER IX

MIMA@MSA PHILOSOPHY [Footnote ref 1]

A Comparative Review.

The Nyaya-Vais'e@sika philosophy looked at experience from
a purely common sense point of view and did not work with any
such monistic tendency that the ultimate conceptions of our
common sense experience should be considered as coming out of
an original universal (e.g. prak@rti of the Sam@khya). Space, time,
the four elements, soul, etc. convey the impression that they are
substantive entities or substances. What is perceived of the material
things as qualities such as colour, taste, etc. is regarded as so many
entities which have distinct and separate existence but which
manifest themselves in connection with the substances. So also
karma or action is supposed to be a separate entity, and even
the class notions are perceived as separate entities inhering in
substances. Knowledge (_jnana_) which illuminates all things is
regarded only as a quality belonging to soul, just as there are
other qualities of material objects. Causation is viewed merely
as the collocation of conditions. The genesis of knowledge is
also viewed as similar in nature to the production of any other
physical event. Thus just as by the collocation of certain physical
circumstances a jug and its qualities are produced, so by the
combination and respective contacts of the soul, mind, sense, and
the objects of sense, knowledge (_jnana_) is produced. Soul with
Nyaya is an inert unconscious entity in which knowledge, etc.
inhere. The relation between a substance and its quality, action,
class notion, etc. has also to be admitted as a separate entity, as
without it the different entities being without any principle of
relation would naturally fail to give us a philosophic construction.

Sa@mkhya had conceived of a principle which consisted of an
infinite number of reals of three different types, which by their
combination were conceived to be able to produce all substances,
qualities,