at the indeterminate stage cannot be fully apprehended as an
individual belonging to a class, though the data constituting the
characteristic of the thing as a genus and its differentia are perceived
at the indeterminate stage [Footnote ref 1]. So long as other things are
not remembered these data cannot manifest themselves properly, and
hence the perception of the thing remains indeterminate at the first
stage of perception. At the second stage the self by its past impressions
brings the present perception in relation to past ones
and realizes its character as involving universal and particular. It
is thus apparent that the difference between the indeterminate
and the determinate perception is this, that in the latter case
memory of other things creeps in, but this association of memory
in the determinate perception refers to those other objects of
memory and not to the percept. It is also held that though the
determinate perception is based upon the indeterminate one, yet
since the former also apprehends certain such factors as did not
enter into the indeterminate perception, it is to be regarded as
a valid cognition. Kumarila also agrees with Prabhakara in
holding both the indeterminate and the determinate perception
valid [Footnote ref 2].

Some Ontological Problems connected with the
Doctrine of Perception.

The perception of the class (_jati_) of a percept in relation to
other things may thus be regarded in the main as a difference
between determinate and indeterminate perceptions. The problems
of jati and avayavavayavi (part and whole notion) were

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[Footnote 1: Compare this with the Vais'e@sika view as interpreted by
S'ridhara.]

[Footnote 2: See _Prakara@napancika_ and _S'astradipika_.]

380

the subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy. Before entering
into discussion about jati, Prabhakara first introduced the
problem of _avayava_ (part) and _avayavi_ (whole). He argues as
an exponent of svata@h-prama@nyavada that the proof of the true
existence of anything must ultimately rest on our own consciousness,
and what is distinctly recognized in consciousness
must be admitted to have its existence established. Following
this canon Prabhakara says that gross objects as a whole exist,
since they are so perceived. The subtle atoms are the material
cause and their connection (_sa@myoga_) is the immaterial cause
(_asamavayikara@na_),