ception in two stages, the first
stage is called _nirvikalpa_ (indeterminate) and the second _savikalpa_
(determinate). The nirvikalpa perception of a thing is its perception
at the first moment of the association of the senses and
their objects. Thus Kumarila says that the cognition that appears
first is a mere _alocana_ or simple perception, called non-determinate
pertaining to the object itself pure and simple, and resembling
the cognitions that the new-born infant has of things around
himself. In this cognition neither the genus nor the differentia is
presented to consciousness; all that is present there is the
individual wherein these two subsist. This view of indeterminate
perception may seem in some sense to resemble the Buddhist
view which defines it as being merely the specific individuality
(_svalak@sa@na_} and regards it as being the only valid element in
perception, whereas all the rest are conceived as being imaginary

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Prakara@napancika_, pp. 53 etc., and Dr Ga@nganatha Jha's
_Prabhakaramima@msa_, pp. 35 etc.]

[Footnote 2: _S'lokavarttika_, see _Pratyak@sasutra_, 40 etc., and
_Nyayaratnakara_ on it. It may be noted in this connection that
Sa@mkhya-Yoga did not think like Nyaya that the senses actually went
out to meet the objects (_prapyakaritva_) but held that there was
a special kind of functioning (_v@rtti_) by virtue of which the
senses could grasp even such distant objects as the sun and the stars.
It is the functioning of the sense that reached the objects. The nature
of the v@rtti is not further clearly explained and Parthasarathi objects
to it as being almost a different category (_tattvantara_).]

379

impositions. But both Kumarila and Prabhakara think that both
the genus and the differentia are perceived in the indeterminate
stage, but these do not manifest themselves to us only because
we do not remember the other things in relation to which, or in
contrast to which, the percept has to show its character as genus or
differentia; a thing can be cognized as an "individual" only in
comparison with other things from which it differs in certain well-defined
characters; and it can be apprehended as belonging to a
class only when it is found to possess certain characteristic features
in common with some other things; so we see that as other things
are not presented to consciousness through memory, the percept