es the inference of a separate entity as the
vehicle of knowledge etc. The objection is sometimes raised that
if the soul is omnipresent how can it be called an agent or a
mover? But Mima@msa does not admit that movement means
atomic motion, for the principle of movement is the energy which
moves the atoms, and this is possessed by the omnipresent soul.
It is by the energy imparted by it to the body that the latter
moves. So it is that though the soul does not move it is called an
agent on account of the fact that it causes the movement of
the body. The self must also be understood as being different
from the senses, for even when one loses some of the senses
he continues to perceive his self all the same as persisting all
through.
The question now arises, how is self cognized? Prabhakara
holds that the self as cognizor is never cognized apart from the
cognized object, nor is the object ever cognized without the cognizor
entering into the cognition as a necessary factor. Both the
self and the object shine forth in the self-luminous knowledge in
what we have already described as tripu@ti-pratyak@sa (perception
as three-together). It is not the soul which is self-illumined but
knowledge; so it is knowledge which illumines both the self and
the object in one operation. But just as in the case of a man
who walks, the action of walking rests upon the walker, yet he is
regarded as the agent of the work and not as the object, so in the
case of the operation of knowledge, though it affects the self, yet
it appears as the agent and not as the object. Cognition is not
soul, but the soul is manifested in cognition as its substratum,
and appears in it as the cognitive element "I" which is inseparable
from all cognitions. In deep sleep therefore when no object is
cognized the self also is not cognized.
Kumarila however thinks that the soul which is distinct from
the body is perceived by a mental perception (_manasa-pratyak@sa_
as the substratum of the notion of "I," or in other words the self
perceives itself by mental perception, and the perception of its
401
own nature shines forth in consciousness as the "I." The objection
that the self cannot itself be both subject and object to its
own operation does not hold, for it applies equally to Prabhakara's
theory in which knowledge reveals the self as its object and yet
considers it as the subject of the operation. The analogy of
linguistic usage that though the walking affe
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