the perception to the object and
its value for us in the practical realization of our ends. The
question of the relation of the external world with knowledge as
determining the latter is regarded as unimportant.

411

The Yogacaras or idealistic Buddhists take their cue from
the above-mentioned Sautrantika Buddhists, and say that since
we can come into touch with knowledge and knowledge alone,
what is the use of admitting an external world of objects as the
data of sensation determining our knowledge? You say that
sensations are copies of the external world, but why should you
say that they copy, and not that they alone exist? We never come
into touch with objects in themselves; these can only be grasped
by us simultaneously with knowledge of them, they must therefore
be the same as knowledge (_sahopalambhaniyamat abhedo
nilataddhiyo@h_); for it is in and through knowledge that external
objects can appear to us, and without knowledge we
are not in touch with the so-called external objects. So it is
knowledge which is self-apparent in itself, that projects itself in
such a manner as to appear as referring to other external objects.
We all acknowledge that in dreams there are no external
objects, but even there we have knowledge. The question
why then if there are no external objects, there should be so
much diversity in the forms of knowledge, is not better solved
by the assumption of an external world; for in such an assumption,
the external objects have to be admitted as possessing the
infinitely diverse powers of diversely affecting and determining
our knowledge; that being so, it may rather be said that in
the beginningless series of flowing knowledge, preceding knowledge-moments
by virtue of their inherent specific qualities determine
the succeeding knowledge-moments. Thus knowledge
alone exists; the projection of an external word is an illusion of
knowledge brought about by beginningless potencies of desire
(_vasana_) associated with it. The preceding knowledge determines
the succeeding one and that another and so on. Knowledge,
pleasure, pain, etc. are not qualities requiring a permanent entity
as soul in which they may inhere, but are the various forms
in which knowledge appears. Even the cognition, "I perceive a
blue thing," is but a form of knowledge, and this is often erroneously
interpreted as referring to a permanent knower. Though
the cognitions are all passing and momentary, yet so long as
the ser