on of the jug on the
ground, for the general negation in relation to other things is there.
Thus negation of a thing cannot mean the general notion of the
negation of all specific things; similarly a general negation without
any specific object to which it might apply cannot manifest
itself to consciousness; the notion of a general negation of knowledge
is thus opposed to any and every knowledge, so that if the
latter is present the former cannot be, but the perception "I do
not know" can persist, even though many individual objects be
known to us. Thus instead of saying that the perception of "I do
not know" is the perception of a special kind of negation, it is
rather better to say that it is the perception of a different category
namely the indefinite, the ajnana. It is our common experience

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that after experiencing the indefinite (_ajnana_) of a specific type
we launch forth in our endeavours to remove it. So it has to be
admitted that the perception of the indefinite is different from the
perception of mere negation. The character of our perceiving
consciousness (_sak@si_) is such that both the root ajnana as well
as its diverse forms with reference to particular objects as represented
in mental states (_v@rtti-jnana_), are comprehended by it.
Of course when the v@rttijnana about a thing as in ordinary
perceptions of objects comes in, the ajnana with regard to it is
temporarily removed, for the v@rttijnana is opposed to the ajnana.
But so far as our own perceiving consciousness (_sak@si-caitanya_)
is conceived it can comprehend both the ajnana and the jnana
(knowledge) of things. It is thus often said that all things show
themselves to the perceiving consciousness either as known or
as unknown. Thus the perceiving consciousness comprehends all
positives either as indefinite ajnana or as states of knowledge
or as specific kinds of ajnana or ignorance, but it is unable to
comprehend a negation, for negation (_abhava_) is not a perception,
but merely the absence of perception (_anupalabdhi_). Thus when
I say I do not know this, I perceive the indefinite in consciousness
with reference to that thing, and this is not the perception of a
negation of the thing. An objection is sometimes raised from
the Nyaya point of view that since without the knowledge of a
qualification (_vis'e@sana_) the qualified thing (_vis'i@s@ta_) cannot be
known, the indefinite about an object cannot be present in consciousness
without t