the inference,
but only subjective and formal validity. A single perception of
concomitance may in certain cases generate the notion of the
concomitance of one thing with another when no contradictory
instance is known. It is immaterial with the Vedanta whether this
concomitance is experienced in one case or in hundreds of cases.
The method of agreement in presence is the only form of concomitance
(_anvayavyapti_) that the Vedanta allows. So the
Vedanta discards all the other kinds of inference that Nyaya
supported, viz. _anvayavyatireki_ (by joining agreement in presence
with agreement in absence), _kevalanvayi_ (by universal agreement
where no test could be applied of agreement in absence) and
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_kevalavyatireki_ (by universal agreement in absence). Vedanta
advocates three premisses, viz. (1) _pratijna_ (the hill is fiery);
(2) _hetu_ (because it has smoke) and (3) _d@rs@tanta_ (as in the
kitchen) instead of the five propositions that Nyaya maintained [Footnote
ref 1]. Since one case of concomitance is regarded by Vedanta as
being sufficient for making an inference it holds that seeing the
one case of appearance (silver in the conch-shell) to be false,
we can infer that all things (except Brahman) are false (_Brahmabhinnam
sarvam mithya Brahmabhinnatvat yedevam tadevam yatha s'uktirupyam_).
First premiss (_pratijna_) all else excepting Brahman is false; second
premiss (_hetu_) since all is different from Brahman; third premiss
(_dr@s@tanta_) whatever is so is so as the silver in the conch [Footnote
ref 2].
Atman, Jiva, Is'vara, Ekajivavada and D@r@s@tis@r@s@tivada.
We have many times spoken of truth or reality as self-luminous
(_svayamprakas'a). But what does this mean? Vedanta
defines it as that which is never the object of a knowing act but
is yet immediate and direct with us (_avedyatve sati
aparoksavyavaharayogyatvam_). Self-luminosity thus means the
capacity of being ever present in all our acts of consciousness
without in any way being an object of consciousness. Whenever
anything is described as an object of consciousness, its character
as constituting its knowability is a quality, which may or may not
be present in it, or may be present at one time and absent at another.
This makes it dependent on some other such entity which can
produce it or manifest it. Pure consciousness differs from all its
objects in this that it is never dependent on anything else for
its manifestation, but manifests all
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