other objects such as the jug,
the cloth, etc. If consciousness should require another consciousness
to manifest it, then that might again require another, and
that another, and so on _ad infinitum_ (_anavastha_). If consciousness
did not manifest itself at the time of the object-manifestation,
then even on seeing or knowing a thing one might doubt if he
had seen or known it. It is thus to be admitted that consciousness
(_anubhuti_) manifests itself and thereby maintains the appearance

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Vedanta would have either pratijna, hetu and udaharana, or
udahara@na, upanaya and nigamana, and not all the five of Nyaya, viz.
pratijna, hetu, udahara@na, upanaya and nigamana.]

[Footnote 2: Vedantic notions of the pramana of upamana, arthapatti,
s'abda and anupalabdhi, being similar to the mimam@sa view, do not
require to be treated here separately.]

475

of all our world experience. This goes directly against
the jnatata theory of Kumarila that consciousness was not immediate
but was only inferable from the manifesting quality
(_jnatata_) of objects when they are known in consciousness.

Now Vedanta says that this self-luminous pure consciousness
is the same as the self. For it is only self which is not the object
of any knowledge and is yet immediate and ever present in
consciousness. No one doubts about his own self, because it
is of itself manifested along with all states of knowledge. The
self itself is the revealer of all objects of knowledge, but is
never itself the object of knowledge, for what appears as the
perceiving of self as object of knowledge is but association
comprehended under the term aha@mkara (ego). The real self is
identical with the pure manifesting unity of all consciousness.
This real self called the atman is not the same as the jiva or
individual soul, which passes through the diverse experiences
of worldly life. Is'vara also must be distinguished from this
highest atman or Brahman. We have already seen that many
Vedantists draw a distinction between maya and avidya. Maya
is that aspect of ajnana by which only the best attributes
are projected, whereas avidya is that aspect by which impure
qualities are projected. In the former aspect the functions are
more of a creative, generative (_vik@sepa_) type, whereas in the latter
veiling (_avara@na_) characteristics are most prominent. The relation
of the cit or pure intelli