e rendered false, when this is contradicted
by right knowledge of Brahman as the one reality. Thus the
knowledge of the world appearance is true now, but not true
absolutely. The only absolute truth is the pure consciousness
which is never contradicted in any experience at any time. The
truth of our world-knowledge is thus to be tested by finding out
whether it will be contradicted at any stage of world experience
or not. That which is not contradicted by later experience is to
be regarded as true, for all world knowledge as a whole will be
contradicted when Brahma-knowledge is realized.

The inner experiences of pleasure and pain also are generated
by a false identification of anta@hkara@na transformations as
pleasure or pain with the self, by virtue of which are generated
the perceptions, "I am happy," or "I am sorry." In continuous
perception of anything for a certain time as an object
or as pleasure, etc. the mental state or v@rtti is said to last in the
same way all the while so long as any other new form is not
taken up by the anta@hkara@na for the acquirement of any new
knowledge. In such case when I infer that there is fire on the
hill that I see, the hill is an object of perception, for the anta@hkara@na
v@rtti is one with it, but that there is fire in it is a matter
of inference, for the anta@hkara@na v@rtti cannot be in touch with the
fire; so in the same experience there may be two modes of

483

mental modification, as perception in seeing the hill, and as
inference in inferring the fire in the hill. In cases of acquired
perception, as when on seeing sandal wood I think that it is
odoriferous sandal wood, it is pure perception so far as the sandal
wood is concerned, it is inference or memory so far as I assert it
to be odoriferous. Vedanta does not admit the existence of the
relation called _samavaya_ (inherence) or _jati_ (class notion); and
so does not distinguish perception as a class as distinct from the
other class called inference, and holds that both perception and
inference are but different modes of the transformations of the
anta@hkara@na reflecting the cit in the corresponding v@rttis. The
perception is thus nothing but the cit manifestation in the anta@hkara@na
v@rtti transformed into the form of an object with which it is
in contact. Perception in its objective aspect is the identity of
the cit underlying the object with the subject, and perception in
the subjective aspect is regarded as t