ce with it, but with Vedanta it meant
correctness to facts and want of contradiction. The absence of
do@sa being guaranteed there is nothing which can vitiate the
correctness of knowledge [Footnote ref 1].

Vedanta Theory of Illusion.

We have already seen that the Mima@msists had asserted that
all knowledge was true simply because it was knowledge (_yathartha@h
sarve vivadaspadibhuta@h pratyaya@h pratyayatvat_). Even
illusions were explained by them as being non-perception of the
distinction between the thing perceived (e.g. the conch-shell), and
the thing remembered (e.g. silver). But Vedanta objects to this,
and asks how there can be non-distinction between a thing which
is clearly perceived and a thing which is remembered? If it is
said that it is merely a non-perception of the non-association (i.e.
non-perception of the fact that this is not connected with silver),
then also it cannot be, for then it is on either side mere negation,
and negation with Mima@msa is nothing but the bare presence of the
locus of negation (e.g. negation of jug on the ground is nothing but
the bare presence of the ground), or in other words non-perception
of the non-association of "silver" and "this" means barely
and merely the "silver" and "this." Even admitting for argument's
sake that the distinction between two things or two ideas
is not perceived, yet merely from such a negative aspect no one
could be tempted to move forward to action (such as stooping
down to pick up a piece of illusory silver). It is positive

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[Footnote 1: See _Vedantaparibha@sa, S'ikhama@ni, Ma@niprabha_ and Citsukha
on svata@hprama@nya.]

486

conviction or perception that can lead a man to actual practical
movement. If again it is said that it is the general and imperfect
perception of a thing (which has not been properly differentiated
and comprehended) before me, which by the memory of silver
appears to be like true silver before me and this generates the
movement for picking it up, then this also is objectionable. For
the appearance of the similarity with real silver cannot lead us
to behave with the thing before me as if it were real silver. Thus
I may perceive that gavaya (wild ox) is similar to cow, but despite
this similarity I am not tempted to behave with the gavaya as
if it were a cow. Thus in whatever way the Mima@msa position
may be defined it fails [Footnote ref l]. V