ory of the real, the self-luminous
Brahman, and the category of the indefinite. The latter
has for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle by
which the one unchangeable Brahman is falsely manifested in all
the diversity of the manifold world. But this indefinite which is
different from the category of the positive and the negative, has
only a relative existence and will ultimately vanish, when the
true knowledge of the Brahman dawns. Nothing however can
be known about the nature of this indefinite except its character
as indefinite. That all the phenomena of the world, the fixed
order of events, the infinite variety of world-forms and names,
all these are originated by this avidya, ajnana or maya is indeed
hardly comprehensible. If it is indefinite nescience, how can all
these well-defined forms of world-existence come out of it? It is
said to exist only relatively, and to have only a temporary existence
beside the permanent infinite reality. To take such a principle
and to derive from it the mind, matter, and indeed everything
else except the pure self-luminous Brahman, would hardly
appeal to our reason. If this system of world-order were only
seeming appearance, with no other element of truth in it except
pure being, then it would be indefensible in the light of reason.
It has been proved that whatever notions we have about the
objective world are all self-contradictory, and thus groundless and
false. If they have all proceeded from the indefinite they must
show this character when exposed to discerning criticism. All
categories have to be shown to be so hopelessly confused and to
be without any conceivable notion that though apparent before
us yet they crumble into indefiniteness as soon as they are

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examined, and one cannot make such assertion about them as
that they are or that they are not. Such negative criticisms of our
fundamental notions about the world-order were undertaken by
S'rihar@sa and his commentator and follower Citsukha. It is impossible
within the limits of this chapter, to give a complete
account of their criticisms of our various notions of reality.
I shall give here, only one example.

Let us take the examination of the notion of difference
(_bheda_)from _Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhadya_. Four explanations are
possible about the notion of difference: (1) the difference may be
perceived as appearing in its own characteristics in our experience
(_svarupa-bheda_) as Prabhakara thin