ks; (2) the difference
between two things is nothing but the absence of one in the other
(_anyonyabhava_), as some Naiyayikas and Bha@t@tas think; (3) difference
means divergence of characteristics (_vaidharmya_) as the
Vais'e@sikas speak of it; (4) difference may be a separate quality
in itself like the p@rthaktva quality of Nyaya. Taking the first
alternative, we see that it is said that the jug and the cloth
represent in themselves, by their very form and existence, their
mutual difference from each other. But if by perceiving the
cloth we only perceive its difference from the jug as the characteristic
of the cloth, then the jug also must have penetrated
into the form of the cloth, otherwise how could we perceive
in the cloth its characteristics as the difference from the jug?
i.e. if difference is a thing which can be directly perceived by
the senses, then as difference would naturally mean difference
from something else, it is expected that something else such
as jug, etc. from which the difference is perceived, must also
be perceived directly in the perception of the cloth. But if
the perception of "difference" between two things has penetrated
together in the same identical perception, then the self-contradiction
becomes apparent. Difference as an entity is not what
we perceive in the cloth, for difference means difference from
something else, and if that thing from which the difference is
perceived is not perceived, then how can the difference as an
entity be perceived? If it is said that the cloth itself represents
its difference from the jug, and that this is indicated by the jug,
then we may ask, what is the nature of the jug? If the difference
from the cloth is the very nature of the jug, then the cloth
itself is also involved in the nature of the jug. If it is said that
463
the jug only indicates a term from which difference
is intended to be conveyed, then that also becomes impossible,
for how can we imagine that there is a term which is independent
of any association of its difference from other things,
and is yet a term which establishes the notion of difference? If
it is a term of difference, it cannot be independent of its relation
to other things from which it is differentiated. If its difference
from the cloth is a quality of the jug, then also the old difficulty
comes in, for its difference from the cloth would involve the
cloth also in itself; and if the cloth is involved in the nature of
th
|