rough
all experience, and the effect-phenomena are but impositions upon
it of ajnana or avidya. It is thus the clay, the permanent, that
is regarded as the cause of all clay-phenomena as jug, plates,
etc. All the various modes in which the clay appears are mere
appearances, unreal, indefinable and so illusory. The one truth
is the clay. So in all world-phenomena the one truth is
being, the Brahman, and all the phenomena that are being
imposed on it are but illusory forms and names. This is what
is called the _satkaryavada_ or more properly the _satkara@navada_
of the Vedanta, that the cause alone is true and ever existing,
and phenomena in themselves are false. There is only this
much truth in them, that all are imposed on the reality or being
which alone is true. This appearance of the one cause the
being, as the unreal many of the phenomena is what is called
the _vivarttavada_ as distinguished from the _sa@mkhyayogapari@namavada_,
in which the effect is regarded as the real development
of the cause in its potential state. When the effect has a
different kind of being from the cause it is called _vivartta_ but
when the effect has the same kind of being as the cause it is called
_pari@nama (kara@nasvalak@sa@nanyathabhava@h pari@nama@h tadvilak@sa@no
vivartta@h_ or _vastunastatsamattako'nyathabhava@h pari@nama@h
tadvi@samasattaka@h vivartta@h)_. Vedanta has as much to object
against the Nyaya as against the pari@nama theory of causation
of the Sa@mkhya; for movement, development, form, potentiality,
and actuality--all these are indefinable and inconceivable in the
light of reason; they cannot explain causation but only restate
things and phenomena as they appear in the world. In reality
however though phenomena are not identical with the cause,
they can never be defined except in terms of the cause (_Tadabhedam
vinaiva tadvyatireke@na durvacam karyyam vivartta@h)_.

This being the relation of cause and effect or Brahman and the
world, the different followers of S'a@nkara Vedanta in explaining
the cause of the world-appearance sometimes lay stress on the
maya, ajnana or avidya, sometimes on the Brahman, and sometimes
on them both. Thus Sarvaj@natmamuni, the writer of
_Sa@nk@sepa-s'ariraka_ and his followers think that the pure Brahman
should be regarded as the causal substance (_upadana_) of the
world-appearance, whereas Prakas'atman Akhan@dananda, and

469

Madhava hold that Brahman in association with maya, i.e. t