e is
false, for it is not possible for us to discover any true relation
between the consciousness (_d@rk_) and the objects of consciousness
(_d@rs'ya_). Consciousness must be admitted to have some kind of
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connection with the objects which it illumines, for had it not been
so there could be any knowledge at any time irrespective of its
connections with the objects. But it is not possible to imagine
any kind of connection between consciousness and its objects, for
it can neither be contact (_sa@myoga_) nor inherence (_samavaya_);
and apart from these two kinds of connections we know of no
other. We say that things are the objects of our consciousness,
but what is meant by it is indeed difficult to define. It cannot
be that objectivity of consciousness means that a special effect
like the jnatata of Mima@msa is produced upon the object, for such
an effect is not admissible or perceivable in any way; nor can
objectivity also mean any practical purpose (of being useful to us)
associated with the object as Prabhakara thinks, for there are
many things which are the objects of our consciousness but not
considered as useful (e.g. the sky). Objectivity also cannot mean
that the thing is the object of the thought-movement (_jnana-kara@na_)
involved in knowledge, for this can only be with reference
to objects present to the perceiver, and cannot apply to objects
of past time about which one may be conscious, for if the thing is
not present how can it be made an object of thought-movement?
Objectivity further cannot mean that the things project their own
forms on the knowledge and are hence called objects, for though
this may apply in the case of perception, it cannot be true of
inference, where the object of consciousness is far away and does
not mould consciousness after its own form. Thus in whatever
way we may try to conceive manifold things existing separately
and becoming objects of consciousness we fail. We have also
seen that it is difficult to conceive of any kind of relation subsisting
between objects and consciousness, and hence it has to be
admitted that the imposition of the world-appearance is after all
nothing but illusory.
Now though all things are but illusory impositions on consciousness
yet for the illumination of specific objects it is admitted
even by Vedanta that this can only take place through specific
sense-contact and particular mental states (_v@rtti_) or modes; but
if that be so why not rathe
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