blue" in its specific
character in the mind and when this is associated by the affirmative
or ideational process, the result is the concept or idea "this is blue"
(_nilasarupa@m pratyak@samanubhuyamana@m nilabodharupamavasthapyate ...
nilasarupyamasya prama@nam nilavikalpanarupa@m tvasya prama@naphalam_,
N.T.p. 22). At the first moment there is the appearance of the blue
(_nilanirbhasa@m hi vijnanam_, N.T. 19) and this is direct acquaintance
(_yatkincit arthasya sak@satkarijnanam tatpratyak@samucyate_, N.T. 7) and
this is real (_paramarthasat_) and valid. This blue sensation is
different from the idea "this is blue" (_nilabodha_, N.T. 22) which is
the result of the former (_prama@naphala_) through the association of
the affirmative process (_adhyavasaya_) and is regarded as invalid for
it contains elements other than what were presented to the sense and is
a _vikalpapratyaya_. In my opinion _svalak@sa@na_ therefore means pure
sensation of the moment presenting the specific features of the object
and with Dharmakirtti this is the only thing which is valid in perception
and vikalpapratyaya or pramanaphala is the idea or concept which follows
it. But though the latter is a product of the former, yet, being the
construction of succeeding moments, it cannot give us the pure stage
of the first moment of sensation-presentation (_k@sa@nasya
prapayitumas'akyatvat_, N.T. 16). N.T. = _Nyayabindu@tika_,
N = _Nyayabindu (Peterson's edition).]

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ideational concept and power that such knowledge has of showing
the means which being followed the thing can be got (_yena k@rtena
artha@h prapito bhavati_). Prama@na then is the similarity of the
knowledge with the object by which it is generated, by which we
assure ourselves that this is our knowledge of the object as it is
perceived, and are thus led to attain it by practical experience.
Yet this later stage is prama@naphala and not prama@na which
consists merely in the vision of the thing (devoid of other associations),
and which determines the attitude of the perceiver towards
the perceived object. The prama@na therefore only refers
to the newly-acquired knowledge (_anadhigatadhigant@r_) as this is
of use to the perceiver in determining his relations with the objective
world. This account of perception leaves out the real
epistemological question as to how the knowledge is generated
by the external world, or what it is in itself. It only looks to
the correctness or faithfulness of