as opposed to the _pure idea_ of a jug (s'uddha kalpana), an element of
reality, the sensational k@sa@na, which is communicated to us by sense
knowledge. Kant's 'thing in itself' is also a k@sa@na and also an element
of sense knowledge of pure sense as opposed to pure reason, Dharmakirtti
has also _s'uddha kalpana_ and _s'uddham pratyak@sam_. ...And very
interesting is the opposition between pratyak@sa and anumana, the first
moves from k@sa@na to sa@mtana and the second from sa@mtana to k@sa@na,
that is the reason that although bhranta the anumana is nevertheless
prama@na because through it we indirectly also reach k@sa@na, the
arthakriyak@sa@na. It is bhranta directly and prama@na indirectly;
pratyak@sa is prama@na directly and bhranta (asatkalpa) indirectly... ."
So far as the passages to which Professor Stcherbatsky refers are
concerned, I am in full agreement with him. But I think that he pushes
the interpretation too far on Kantian lines. When I perceive "this is
blue," the perception consists of two parts, the actual presentative
element of sense-knowledge (_svalak@sa@na_) and the affirmation
(_nis'caya_). So far we are in complete agreement. But Professor
Stcherbatsky says that this sense-knowledge is a k@sa@na (moment)
and is nothing. I also hold that it is a k@sa@na, but it is nothing
only in the sense that it is not the same as the notion involving
affirmation such as "this is blue." The affirmative process
occurring at the succeeding moments is determined by the presentative
element of the first moment (_pratyak@sabalotpanna_ N.T., p. 20) but
this presentative element divested from the product of the affirmative
process of the succeeding moments is not characterless, though we cannot
express its character; as soon as we try to express it, names and other
ideas consisting of affirmation are associated and these did not form
a part of the presentative element. Its own character is said to be its
own specific nature (_svalak@sa@na_). But what is this specific nature?
Dharmakirtti's answer on this point is that by specific nature he means
those specific characteristics of the object which appear clear when
the object is near and hazy when it is at a distance (_yasyarthasya
sannidhanasannidhanabkyam jnanapratibhasabhedastat svalak@sa@nam_ N.,
p. 1 and N.T., p. 16). Sense-knowledge thus gives us the specific
characteristics of the object, and this has the same form as the
object itself; it is the appearance of the "