is
concerned with the fulfilment of his ends and desires (_puru@sadrtka_).
This however cannot be done without right knowledge (_samyagjnana_)
which rightly represents things to men. Knowledge is said
to be right when we can get things just as we perceived them.
So far as mere representation or illumination of objects is concerned,
it is a patent fact that we all have knowledge, and therefore
this does not deserve criticism or examination. Our enquiry about
knowledge is thus restricted to its aspect of later verification or
contradiction in experience, for we are all concerned to know how
far our perceptions of things which invariably precede all our
actions can be trusted as rightly indicating what we want to get
in our practical experience (_arthapradpakatva_). The perception is
right (_abhranta_ non-illusory) when following its representation we
can get in the external world such things as were represented by
it (_sa@mvadakatva_). That perception alone can be right which is
generated by the object and not merely supplied by our imagination.
When I say "this is the cow I had seen," what I see is the
object with the brown colour, horns, feet, etc., but the fact that
this is called cow, or that this is existing from a past time, is
not perceived by the visual sense, as this is not generated by
the visual object. For all things are momentary, and that which
I see now never existed before so as to be invested with this
or that permanent name. This association of name and permanence
to objects perceived is called _kaipana_ or _abhilapa_.
Our perception is correct only so far as it is without the abhilapa
association (_kalpanapo@dha_), for though this is taken as a part of
our perceptual experience it is not derived from the object, and
hence its association with the object is an evident error. The
object as unassociated with name--the nirvikalpa--is thus what
is perceived. As a result of the pratyak@sa the manovijnana or
thought and mental perception of pleasure and pain is also
determined. At one moment perception reveals the object as an
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object of knowledge (_grahya_), and by the fact of the rise
of such a percept, at another moment it appears as a thing
realizable or attainable in the external world. The special
features of the object undefinable in themselves as being
what they are in themselves (_svalak@sa@na_) are what is
actually perceived (_pratyak@savi@saya_) [Footnote ref 1].
The _prama@naphala_ (resul
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