cts the walker yet
he is the agent, cannot be regarded as an escape from this charge,
for the usage of language is not philosophical analysis. Though
at the time of the cognition of objects the self is cognized, yet it
does not appear as the knower of the knowledge of objects, but
reveals itself as an object of a separate mental perception which
is distinct from the knowledge of objects. The self is no doubt
known as the substratum of "I," but the knowledge of this self
does not reveal itself necessarily with the cognition of objects,
nor does the self show itself as the knower of all knowledge of
objects, but the self is apprehended by a separate mental intuition
which we represent as the "I." The self does not reveal itself as
the knower but as an object of a separate intuitive process of the
mind. This is indeed different from Prabhakara's analysis, who
regarded the cognition of self as inseparable from the object-cognition,
both being the result of the illumination of knowledge.
Kumarila agrees with Prabhakara however in holding that soul
is not self-illuminating (_svayamprakas'a_), for then even in deep
sleep the soul should have manifested itself; but there is no such
manifestation then, and the state of deep sleep appears as an
unconscious state. There is also no bliss in deep sleep, for had
it been so people would not have regretted that they had missed
sensual enjoyments by untimely sleep. The expression that
"I slept in bliss" signifies only that no misery was felt. Moreover
the opposite representation of the deep sleep state is also found
when a man on rising from sleep says "I slept so long without
knowing anything not even my own self." The self is not
atomic, since we can simultaneously feel a sensation in the head
as well as in the leg. The Jaina theory that it is of the size of
the body which contracts and expands according to the body it
occupies is unacceptable. It is better therefore that the soul should
be regarded as all-pervading as described in the Vedas. This
self must also be different in different persons for otherwise their
individual experiences of objects and of pleasure and pain cannot
be explained [Footnote ref 1].
___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _S'lokavarttika_, atmavada _S'astra-dipika_, atmavada and
mok@savada.]

402

Kumarila considered the self to be merely the potency of
knowledge (jnanas'akti) [Footnote ref 1]. Cognition