anumanasya,
Nyayaratnakara_, p. 363) [Footnote ref 1]. It should also be noted that in
forming the notion of the permanent relation between two things,
a third thing in which these two subsist is always remembered
and for the conception of this permanent relation it is enough
that in the large number of cases where the concomitance was
noted there was no knowledge of any case where the concomitance
failed, and it is not indispensable that the negative instances
in which the absence of the gamya or vyapaka was marked by an

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It is important to note that it is not unlikely that Kumarila
was indebted to Di@nnaga for this; for Di@nnaga's main contention is that
"it is not fire, nor the connection between it and the hill, but it is
the fiery hill that is inferred" for otherwise inference would give us
no new knowledge see Vidyabhu@sa@na's _Indian Logic_, p. 87 and
_Tatparya@tika_, p. 120.]

389

absence of the gamaka or vyapya, should also be noted, for a
knowledge of such a negative relation is not indispensable for
the forming of the notion of the permanent relation [Footnote ref 1]. The
experience of a large number of particular cases in which any two
things were found to coexist together in another thing in some
relation associated with the non-perception of any case of failure
creates an expectancy in us of inferring the presence of the
gamya in that thing in which the gamaka is perceived to exist
in exactly the same relation [Footnote ref 2]. In those cases where the
circle of the existence of the gamya coincides with the circle of the
existence of the gamaka, each of them becomes a gamaka for the other.
It is clear that this form of inference not only includes all cases
of cause and effect, of genus and species but also all cases of
coexistence as well.

The question arises that if no inference is possible without
a memory of the permanent relation, is not the self-validity
of inference destroyed on that account, for memory is not regarded
as self-valid. To this Kumarila's answer is that memory
is not invalid, but it has not the status of pramana, as it does
not bring to us a new knowledge. But inference involves the
acquirement of a new knowledge in this, that though the coexistence
of two things in another was known in a number of cases,
yet in the present case a new case of the existence of the gamya
in a thing is known from