remembered. The difference
of Prabhakara and Kumarila on this point is that while the
latter regards similarity as only a quality consisting in the fact
of more than one object having the same set of qualities, the
former regards it as a distinct category.

_Arthapatti_ (implication) is a new prama@na which is admitted
by the Mima@msa. Thus when we know that a person Devadatta
is alive and perceive that he is not in the house, we cannot reconcile
these two facts, viz. his remaining alive and his not being
in the house without presuming his existence somewhere outside
the house, and this method of cognizing the existence of Devadatta
outside the house is called _arthapatti_ (presumption or
implication).

The exact psychological analysis of the mind in this arthapatti
cognition is a matter on which Prabhakara and Kumarila
disagree. Prabhakara holds that when a man knows that Devadatta
habitually resides in his house but yet does not find him
there, his knowledge that Devadatta is living (though acquired
previously by some other means of proof) is made doubtful, and
the cause of this doubt is that he does not find Devadatta at his
house. The absence of Devadatta from the house is not the cause
of implication, but it throws into doubt the very existence of Devadatta,
and thus forces us to imagine that Devadatta must remain
somewhere outside. That can only be found by implication,
without the hypothesis of which the doubt cannot be removed.
The mere absence of Devadatta from the house is not enough for

392

making the presumption that he is outside the house, for he
might also be dead. But I know that Devadatta was living and
also that he was not at home; this perception of his absence from
home creates a doubt as regards my first knowledge that he is
living, and it is for the removal of this doubt that there creeps in
the presumption that he must be living somewhere else. The
perception of the absence of Devadatta through the intermediate
link of a doubt passes into the notion of a presumption that he
must then remain somewhere else. In inference there is no element
of doubt, for it is only when the smoke is perceived to exist
beyond the least element of doubt that the inference of the fire
is possible, but in presumption the perceived non-existence in the
house leads to the presumption of an external existence only
when it has thrown the fact of the man's being alive into doubt
and uncertainty [Footnote ref 1].