-perception (anupalabdhi).
In addition to the above prama@nas Kumarila admits a fifth
kind of prama@na, viz. _anupalabdhi_ for the perception of the
non-existence of a thing. Kumarila argues that the non-existence of
a thing (e.g. there is no jug in this room) cannot be perceived
by the senses, for there is nothing with which the senses could
come into contact in order to perceive the non-existence. Some
people prefer to explain this non-perception as a case of anumana.
They say that wherever there is the existence of a visible object
there is the vision of it by a perceiver. When there is no vision
of a visible object, there is no existence of it also. But it is easy
to see that such an inference presupposes the perception of want
of vision and want of existence, but how these non-perceptions
are to be accounted for is exactly the point to be solved. How
can the perception of want of vision or want of existence be grasped?
It is for this that we have to admit a separate mode of prama@na
namely anupalabdhi.
All things exist in places either in a positive (_sadrupa_) or in
a negative relation (_asadrupa_), and it is only in the former case
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _Prabhakaramima@msa_ by Dr Ga@nganatha Jha and S.N.
Dasgupta's _Study of Patanjali_, appendix. It may be noted in this
connection that Mima@msa did not favour the Spho@ta doctrine of sound
which consists in the belief that apart from the momentary sounds of
letters composing a word, there was a complete word form which was
manifested (spho@ta) but not created by the passing sounds of the
syllables. The work of the syllable sounds is only to project this
word manifestation. See Vacaspati's _Tattvabindu, S'lokavarttika_
and _Prakara@napancika_. For the doctrine of anvitabhidhana see
Sahkanatha's _Vakyarthamat@rkav@rtti_.]
398
that they come within the purview of the senses, while in the
latter case the perception of the negative existence can only be
had by a separate mode of the movement of the mind which we
designate as a separate prama@na as anupalabdhi. Prabhakara
holds that non-perception of a visible object in a place is only the
perception of the empty place, and that therefore there is no need
of admitting a separate prama@na as anupalabdhi. For what is
meant by empty space? If it is necessary that for the perception
of the non-existence of jug there should be absolutely empty
spac
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