the perception of the existence of the
gamaka and this knowledge is gained by a means which is not
perception, for it is only the gamaka that is seen and not the
gamya. If the gamya is also seen it is no inference at all.

As regards the number of propositions necessary for the explicit
statement of the process of inference for convincing others
(_pararthanumana_) both Kumarila and Prabhakara hold that three
premisses are quite sufficient for inference. Thus the first three
premisses pratijna, hetu and d@rstanta may quite serve the purpose
of an anumana.

There are two kinds of anumana according to Kumarila
viz. pratyak@satod@rstasambandha and samanyatod@r@s@tasambandha.
The former is that kind of inference where the permanent

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Kumarila strongly opposes a Buddhist view that concomitance
(_vyapti_) is ascertained only by the negative instances and not by the
positive ones.]

[Footnote 2: "_tasmadanavagate'pi sarvatranvaye sarvatas'ca vyatireke
bahus'ah sahityavagamamatradeva
vyabhicaradars'anasanathadanumanotpattira@ngikartavya@h._"
_Nyayaratnakara_, p. 288.]

390

relation between two concrete things, as in the case of smoke and
fire, has been noticed. The latter is that kind of inference where
the permanent relation is observed not between two concrete
things but between two general notions, as in the case of movement
and change of place, e.g. the perceived cases where there is
change of place there is also motion involved with it; so from the
change of place of the sun its motion is inferred and it is held
that this general notion is directly perceived like all universals
[Footnote ref 1].

Prabhakara recognizes the need of forming the notion of the
permanent relation, but he does not lay any stress on the fact
that this permanent relation between two things (fire and smoke)
is taken in connection with a third thing in which they both
subsist. He says that the notion of the permanent relation between
two things is the main point, whereas in all other associations
of time and place the things in which these two subsist
together are taken only as adjuncts to qualify the two things
(e.g. fire and smoke). It is also necessary to recognize the fact that
though the concomitance of smoke in fire is only conditional, the
concomitance of the fire in smoke is unconditional and absolute [Footnote
ref 2]. When such a conviction is firml