membered and the object before me is taken as silver. In
illusion the object before us with which our eye is associated is
not conch-shell, for the traits peculiar to it not being grasped, it
is merely an object. The silver is not utterly non-existent, for it
exists elsewhere and it is the memory of it as experienced before
that creates confusion and leads us to think of the conch-shell as
silver. This school agrees with the akhyati school that the fact

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that I remember silver is not taken note of at the time of
illusion. But it holds that the mere non-distinction is not enough
to account for the phenomenon of illusion, for there is a definite
positive aspect associated with it, viz. the false identification of
silver (seen elsewhere) with the conch-shell before us.

The akhyati theory of Mima@msa holds that since the special
peculiarities of the conch-shell are not noticed, it is erroneous
to say that we identify or cognize positively the conch-shell as
the silver (perceived elsewhere), for the conch-shell is not cognized
at all. What happens here is simply this, that only the
features common to conch-shell and silver being noticed, the perceiver
fails to apprehend the difference between these two things,
and this gives rise to the cognition of silver. Owing to a certain
weakness of the mind the remembrance of silver roused by the
common features of the conch-shell and silver is not apprehended,
and the fact that it is only a memory of silver seen in some past
time that has appeared before him is not perceived; and it is as
a result of this non-apprehension of the difference between the
silver remembered and the present conch-shell that the illusion
takes place. Thus, though the illusory perception partakes of a
dual character of remembrance and apprehension, and as such is
different from the ordinary valid perception (which is wholly a
matter of direct apprehension) of real silver before us, yet as the
difference between the remembrance of silver and the sight of
the present object is not apprehended, the illusory perception
appears at the moment of its production to be as valid as a real
valid perception. Both give rise to the same kind of activity on
the part of the agent, for in illusory perception the perceiver
would be as eager to stoop and pick up the thing as in the case
of a real perception. Kumarila agrees with this view as expounded
by Prabhakara, and further says that the illusory judgment is as
v