n be of some kind
of atom which resides in the body ensouled by the cognizing soul.
This atom may be called _manas_ (mind). This manas alone by
itself brings about cognitions, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion,
effort, etc. The manas however by itself is found to be devoid
of any such qualities as colour, smell, etc., and as such cannot
lead the soul to experience or cognize these qualities; hence
it stands in need of such other organs as may be characterized
by these qualities; for the cognition of colour, the mind will
need the aid of an organ of which colour is the characteristic
quality; for the cognition of smell, an organ having the odorous
characteristic and so on with touch, taste, vision. Now we know
that the organ which has colour for its distinctive feature must
be one composed of tejas or light, as colour is a feature of light,
and this proves the existence of the organ, the eye--for the cognition
of colour; in a similar manner the existence of the earthly
organ (organ of smell), the aqueous organ (organ of taste), the
akas'ic organ (organ of sound) and the airy organ (organ of
touch) may be demonstrated. But without manas none of these
organs is found to be effective. Four necessary contacts have
to be admitted, (1) of the sense organs with the object, (2) of the
sense organs with the qualities of the object, (3) of the manas

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with the sense organs, and (4) of the manas with the soul. The
objects of perception are of three kinds,(1) substances, (2) qualities,
(3) jati or class. The material substances are tangible objects of
earth, fire, water, air in large dimensions (for in their fine atomic
states they cannot be perceived). The qualities are colour, taste,
smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction,
priority, posteriority, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and
effort [Footnote ref l].

It may not be out of place here to mention in conclusion that
Kumarila Bha@t@ta was rather undecided as to the nature of the
senses or of their contact with the objects. Thus he says that
the senses may be conceived either as certain functions or
activities, or as entities having the capacity of revealing things
without coming into actual contact with them, or that they might
be entities which actually come in contact with their objects [Footnote ref
2], and he prefers this last view as being more satisfactory.

Indeterminate and determinate perception.

There are two kinds of per