all knowledge the self
is directly and immediately perceived, all knowledge may be regarded
as perception from the point of view of self. The division
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of the prama@nas as pratyak@sa (perception), anumana (inference),
etc. is from the point of view of the objects of knowledge with
reference to the varying modes in which they are brought within
the purview of knowledge. The self itself however has no illumining
or revealing powers, for then even in deep sleep we could have
knowledge, for the self is present even then, as is proved by the
remembrance of dreams. It is knowledge (_sa@mvid_) that reveals
by its very appearance both the self, the knower, and the objects.
It is generally argued against the self-illuminative character of
knowledge that all cognitions are of the forms of the objects they
are said to reveal; and if they have the same form we may rather
say that they have the same identical reality too. The Mima@msa
answer to these objections is this, that if the cognition and the
cognized were not different from one another, they could not
have been felt as such, and we could not have felt that it is
by cognition that we apprehend the cognized objects. The
cognition (_sa@mvedana_) of a person simply means that such a
special kind of quality (_dharma_) has been manifested in the
self by virtue of which his active operation with reference to
a certain object is favoured or determined, and the object of cognition
is that with reference to which the active operation of the
self has been induced. Cognitions are not indeed absolutely formless,
for they have the cognitional character by which things are
illumined and manifested. Cognition has no other character than
this, that it illumines and reveals objects. The things only are
believed to have forms and only such forms as knowledge reveal
to us about them. Even the dream cognition is with reference to
objects that were perceived previously, and of which the impressions
were left in the mind and were aroused by the unseen agency
(_ad@r@s@ta_). Dream cognition is thus only a kind of remembrance
of that which was previously experienced. Only such of the impressions
of cognized objects are roused in dreams as can beget just that
amount of pleasurable or painful experience, in accordance with the
operation of ad@r@s@ta, as the person deserves to have in accordance
with his previous merit or demerit.
The Prabhakara Mima@msa, in refuting the arguments of those
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