guide Hindu civil life even
under the British administration is explained according to the
Mima@msa maxims. Its relations to the Vedanta philosophy will
be briefly indicated in the next chapter. Its relations with
Nyaya-Vais'e@sika have also been pointed out in various places of this
chapter. The views of the two schools of Mima@msa as propounded
by Prabhakara and Kumarila on all the important topics have
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasada S'astri says, in his
introduction to _Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts_, that "Kumarila preceded
Sa@nkara by two generations."]
372
also been pointed out. Prabhakara's views however could not
win many followers in later times, but while living it is said that
he was regarded by Kumarila as a very strong rival [Footnote ref 1]. Hardly
any new contribution has been made to the Mima@msa philosophy
after Kumarila and Prabhakara. The _Mima@msa sutras_ deal mostly
with the principles of the interpretation of the Vedic texts in
connection with sacrifices, and very little of philosophy can be
gleaned out of them. S'abara's contributions are also slight and
vague. Varttikakara's views also can only be gathered from the
references to them by Kumarila and Prabhakara. What we know
of Mima@msa philosophy consists of their views and theirs alone.
It did not develop any further after them. Works written on the
subject in later times were but of a purely expository nature. I do
not know of any work on Mima@msa written in English except
the excellent one by Dr Ga@nganatha Jha on the Prabhakara
Mima@msa to which I have frequently referred.
The Parata@h-prama@nya doctrine of Nyaya and the
Svata@h-prama@nya doctrine of Mima@msa.
The doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge
(_svata@h-prama@nya_) forms the cornerstone on which the whole structure
of the Mima@msa philosophy is based. Validity means the certitude
of truth. The Mima@msa philosophy asserts that all knowledge
excepting the action of remembering (_sm@rti_) or memory is
valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither
depends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other
knowledge for its validity. But Nyaya holds that this self-validity
of knowledge is a question which requires an explanation.
It is true that under certain conditions a piece of knowledge
is produced in us, but what is meant by saying that this
knowledge is a proof of
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