owledge; for objective
facts never come to us directly, they are always taken
on the evidence of knowledge, and they have no other certainty
than what is bestowed on them by knowledge. There arise indeed
different kinds of knowledge revealing different things, but
these latter do not on that account generate the former, for this
is never experienced; we are never aware of any objective fact
before it is revealed by knowledge. Why knowledge makes
different kinds of revelations is indeed more than we can say, for
experience only shows that knowledge reveals objective facts and
not why it does so. The rise of knowledge is never perceived by
us to be dependent on any objective fact, for all objective facts
are dependent on it for its revelation or illumination. This is
what is said to be the self-validity (_svata@h-prama@ya_) of knowledge
in its production (_utpatti_). As soon as knowledge is produced,
objects are revealed to us; there is no intermediate link
between the rise of knowledge and the revelation of objects on
which knowledge depends for producing its action of revealing
or illuminating them. Thus knowledge is not only independent
375
of anything else in its own rise but in its own action as well
(_svakaryakara@ne svata@h prama@nya@m jnanasya_). Whenever there
is any knowledge it carries with it the impression that it is
certain and valid, and we are naturally thus prompted to work
(_prav@rtti_} according to its direction. There is no indecision in
our mind at the time of the rise of knowledge as to the correctness
of knowledge; but just as knowledge rises, it carries with
it the certainty of its revelation, presence, or action. But in cases
of illusory perception other perceptions or cognitions dawn which
carry with them the notion that our original knowledge was not
valid. Thus though the invalidity of any knowledge may appear
to us by later experience, and in accordance with which we
reject our former knowledge, yet when the knowledge first revealed
itself to us it carried with it the conviction of certainty which
goaded us on to work according to its indication. Whenever a man
works according to his knowledge, he does so with the conviction
that his knowledge is valid, and not in a passive or uncertain temper
of mind. This is what Mima@msa means when it says that the
validity of knowledge appears immediately with its rise, though
its invalidity may be derived from later experience or some other
data (_
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