bject has a name, since it is an object of knowledge
(_ida@m, vacyam prameyatvat_)." Now no such case is known which
is not an object of knowledge; we cannot therefore know of any
case where there was no object of knowledge (_prameyatva_) and
no name (_vacyatva_); the vyapti here has therefore to be based
necessarily on cases of agreement--wherever there is prameyatva
or an object of knowledge, there is vacyatva or name.
The third form of kevalavyatireki is that where positive instances
in agreement cannot be found, such as in the case of the
inference that earth differs from other elements in possessing
the specific quality of smell, since all that does not differ from
other elements is not earth, such as water; here it is evident
that there cannot be any positive instance of agreement and the
concomitance has to be taken from negative instances. There
is only one instance, which is exactly the proposition of our
inference--earth differs from other elements, since it has the
special qualities of earth. This inference could be of use only in
those cases where we had to infer anything by reason of such
special traits of it as was possessed by it and it alone.

Upamana and S'abda.

The third prama@na, which is admitted by Nyaya and not by
Vais'e@sika, is _upamana_, and consists in associating a thing unknown
before with its name by virtue of its similarity with some
other known thing. Thus a man of the city who has never
seen a wild ox (_gavaya_) goes to the forest, asks a forester--"what
is gavaya?" and the forester replies--"oh, you do not
know it, it is just like a cow"; after hearing this from the
forester he travels on, and on seeing a gavaya and finding it to
be similar to a cow he forms the opinion that this is a gavaya.
This knowing an hitherto unknown thing by virtue of its
similarity to a known thing is called _upamana_. If some forester
had pointed out a gavaya to a man of the city and had told him
that it was called a gavaya, then also the man would have
known the animal by the name gavaya, but then this would
have been due to testimony (_s'abda-prama@na). The knowledge is
said to be generated by the upamana process when the association
of the unknown animal with its name is made by the observer

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on the strength of the experience of the similarity of the unknown
animal to a known one. The naiyayikas are thorough
realists, and as such they do not regard the observation of
similarity as being due