onclusively proved before the people to the glory of the victorious
opponent. As to the utility of the description of so many debating
tricks by which an opponent might be defeated in a metaphysical
work, the aim of which ought to be to direct the ways that lead to
emancipation, it is said by Jayanta in his _Nyayamanjari_ that these
had to be resorted to as a protective measure against arrogant
disputants who often tried to humiliate a teacher before his pupils.
If the teacher could not silence the opponent, the faith of the
pupils in him would be shaken and great disorder would follow,
and it was therefore deemed necessary that he who was plodding
onward for the attainment of mok@sa should acquire these devices
for the protection of his own faith and that of his pupils. A knowledge
of these has therefore been enjoined in the Nyaya sutra as
being necessary for the attainment of salvation [Footnote ref l].

The doctrine of Soul.

Dhurtta Carvakas denied the existence of soul and regarded
consciousness and life as products of bodily changes; there were
other Carvakas called Sus'ik@sita Carvakas who admitted the
existence of soul but thought that it was destroyed at death.
The Buddhists also denied the existence of any permanent self.
The naiyayikas ascertained all the categories of metaphysics
mainly by such inference as was corroborated by experience.
They argued that since consciousness, pleasures, pains, willing,
etc. could not belong to our body or the senses, there must be

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 586-659, and _Tarkikarak@sa_ of
Varadaraja and _Niska@n@taka_ of Mallinatha, pp. 185 ff.]

363

some entity to which they belonged; the existence of the self
is not proved according to Nyaya merely by the notion of our
self-consciousness, as in the case of Mima@msa, for Nyaya holds
that we cannot depend upon such a perception, for it may
be erroneous. It often happens that I say that I am white or
I am black, but it is evident that such a perception cannot
be relied upon, for the self cannot have any colour. So we
cannot safely depend on our self-consciousness as upon the
inference that the self has to be admitted as that entity to
which consciousness, emotion, etc. adhere when they are produced
as a result of collocations. Never has the production of
atman been experienced, nor has it been found to suffer any
destruction like the bo