the mountain is fiery because it is
an object of knowledge, but even a lake which is opposed to fire
is also an object of knowledge), (2) asadhara@na or too restricted
(e.g. sound is eternal because it has the nature of sound; this
cannot be a reason for the nature of sound exists only in the
sound and nowhere else), and (3) anupasa@mharin or unsubsuming
(e.g. everything is non-eternal, because they are all objects of
knowledge; here the fallacy lies in this, that no instance can be
found which is not an object of knowledge and an opposite conclusion
may also be drawn). The fallacy _satpratipak@sa_ is that in
which there is a contrary reason which may prove the opposite
conclusion (e.g. sound is eternal because it is audible, sound is
non-eternal because it is an effect). The fallacy _asiddha_ (unreal)
is of three kinds (i) _as'rayasiddha_ (the lotus of the sky is fragrant
because it is like other lotuses; now there cannot be any lotus in
the sky), (2) _svarupasiddha_ (sound is a quality because it is
visible; but sound has no visibility), (3) _vyapyatvasiddha_ is that
where the concomitance between the middle and the consequence
is not invariable and inevitable; there is smoke in the hill because
there is fire; but there may be fire without the smoke as in a red
hot iron ball, it is only green-wood fire that is invariably associated
with smoke. The fallacy _badhita_ is that which pretends to prove
a thesis which is against direct experience, e.g. fire is not hot
because it is a substance. We have already enumerated the
fallacies counted by Vais'e@sika. Contrary to Nyaya practice
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Pras'astapada counts the fallacies of the example. Di@nnaga also
counted fallacies of example (e.g. sound is eternal, because it is
incorporeal, that which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms;
but atoms are not incorporeal) and Dharmakirtti counted also the
fallacies of the pak@sa (minor); but Nyaya rightly considers that
the fallacies of the middle if avoided will completely safeguard
inference and that these are mere repetitions. Chala means the
intentional misinterpretation of the opponent's arguments for the
purpose of defeating him. Jati consists in the drawing of contradictory
conclusions, the raising of false issues or the like with
the deliberate intention of defeating an opponent. Nigrahasthana
means the exposure of the opponent's argument as involving
self-contradiction, inconsistency or the like, by which his defeat is
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