e abhava
in a similar way as Kumarila the Mima@msist does, though the
commentators have tried to explain it away [Footnote ref 2]. In Vais'e@sika
the four kinds of negation are enumerated as (1) _pragabhava_ (the
negation preceding the production of an object--e.g. of the jug
before it is made by the potter); (2) _dhva@msabhava_ (the negation
following the destruction of an object--as of the jug after it is
destroyed by the stroke of a stick); (3) _anyonyabhava_ (mutual
negation--e.g. in the cow there is the negation of the horse and

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyayabindu@tika_, pp. 34 ff., and also _Nyayamanjari_,
pp. 48-63.]

[Footnote 2 Pras'astapada says that as the production of an effect is the
sign of the existence of the cause, so the non-production of it is the sign
of its non-existence, S'ridbara in commenting upon it says that the
non-preception of a sensible object is the sign (_li@nga_) of its
non-existence. But evidently he is not satisfied with the view for
he says that non-existence is also directly perceived by the senses
(_bhavavad abhavo'pindriyagraha@nayogyah_) and that there is an actual
sense-contact with non-existence which is the collocating cause of the
preception of non-existence (_abhavendriyasannikar@so'pi
abhavagraha@nasamagri_), Nyayakandali_, pp. 225-30.]

360

in the horse that of the cow); (4) _atyantabhava_ (a negation which
always exists--e.g. even when there is a jug here, its negation in
other places is not destroyed) [Footnote ref 1].

The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices
for the seeker of Salvation.

It is probable that the Nyaya philosophy arose in an atmosphere
of continued disputes and debates; as a consequence
of this we find here many terms related to debates which we do
not notice in any other system of Indian philosophy. These are
_tarka_, _nir@naya_, _vada_, _jalpa_, _vita@n@da_, _hetvabhasa_, _chala_,
_jati_ and _nigrahasthana_.

Tarka means deliberation on an unknown thing to discern
its real nature; it thus consists of seeking reasons in favour of
some supposition to the exclusion of other suppositions; it is not
inference, but merely an oscillation of the mind to come to a right
conclusion. When there is doubt (_sa@ms'aya_) about the specific
nature of anything we have to take to tarka. Nir@naya means the
conclusion to which we arrive as a result of tarka. When two
opposite parties