and this does not
happen, for the same thing which generates sukha in one might
not do so in others. Moreover even admitting for argument's
sake that it is knowledge itself that appears as pleasure and pain,
it is evident that there must be some differences between the
pleasurable and painful experiences that make them so different,
and this difference is due to the fact that knowledge in one case
was associated with sukha and in another case with du@hkha,
This shows that sukha and du@hkha are not themselves knowledge.
Such is the course of things that sukha and du@hkha are generated
by the collocation of certain conditions, and are manifested through
or in association with other objects either in direct perception or
in memory. They are thus the qualities which are generated in
the self as a result of causal operation. It should however be
remembered that merit and demerit act as concomitant causes
in their production.
The yogins are believed to have the pratyak@sa of the most
distant things beyond our senses; they can acquire this power
by gradually increasing their powers of concentration and perceive
the subtlest and most distant objects directly by their
mind. Even we ourselves may at some time have the notions
of future events which come to be true, e.g. sometimes I may
have the intuition that "To-morrow my brother will come,"
___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1:_Siddhantamuktavali_ on _Karika_ 63 and 64. We must remember
that Ga@nges'a discarded the definition of perception as given in the
_Nyaya sutra_ which we have discussed above, and held that perception
should be defined as that cognition which has the special class-character
of direct apprehension. He thinks that the old definition of perception
as the cognition generated by sense-contact involves a vicious circle
(_Tattvacintama@ni_, pp. 538-546). Sense-contact is still regarded by him
as the cause of perception, but it should not be included in the
definition. He agrees to the six kinds of contact described first by
Udyotakara as mentioned above.]
343
and this may happen to be true. This is called pratibhanajnana,
which is also to be regarded as a pratyak@sa directly
by the mind. This is of course different from the other form
of perception called manasa-pratyak@sa, by which memories of
past perceptions by other senses are associated with a percept
visualized at the present moment; thus we see a ros
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