elieve in the
doctrine of the eternality of sound, which the Mima@msa did. Eternality
of sound meant with Mima@msa the theory that sounds existed as eternal
indestructible entities, and they were only manifested in our ears under
certain conditions, e.g. the stroke of a drum or a particular kind of
movement of the vocal muscles.]

345

since no eternal qualities are found in it, and sound like
akas'a is eternal, since no non-eternal qualities are found in it.

The Buddhists held in answer to the objections raised against
inference by the Carvakas, that inferential arguments are
valid, because they are arguments on the principle of the uniformity
of nature in two relations, viz. _tadatmya_ (essential
identity) and _tadutpatti_ (succession in a relation of cause and
effect). Tadatmya is a relation of genus and species and not
of causation; thus we know that all pines are trees, and infer
that this is a tree since it is a pine; tree and pine are related
to each other as genus and species, and the co-inherence of
the generic qualities of a tree with the specific characters of a
pine tree may be viewed as a relation of essential identity
(_tadatmya_). The relation of tadutpatti is that of uniformity of
succession of cause and effect, e.g. of smoke to fire.

Nyaya holds that inference is made because of the invariable
association (_niyama_) of the li@nga or hetu (the concomitance of
which with the sadhya has been safeguarded by the five conditions
noted above) with the sadhya, and not because of such specific
relations as tadatmya or tadutpatti. If it is held that the
inference that it is a tree because it is a pine is due to the
essential identity of tree and pine, then the opposite argument
that it is a pine because it is a tree ought to be valid as well;
for if it were a case of identity it ought to be the same both
ways. If in answer to this it is said that the characteristics of a
pine are associated with those of a tree and not those of a tree with
those of a pine, then certainly the argument is not due to essential
identity, but to the invariable association of the li@nga (mark)
with the li@ngin (the possessor of li@nga), otherwise called niyama.
The argument from tadutpatti (association as cause and effect)
is also really due to invariable association, for it explains the
case of the inference of the type of cause and effect as well as of
other types of inference, where the association as cause and
effect is no